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Summary  findings
RavalCion  and Wodon try to determine whether children  reduction in the incidence of child labor among boys
seln to  work in rural Bangladesh are caught in a poverty  (girls) represents about one-quarter  (one-eighth) of the
trap, with the extra incorne to poor families from child  increase in their school enrollment rate. Parents are
labor comiing  at the expense of the chilcdren's  longer-term  clearly substituting other uses of their children's time to
prospects of escaping povei-ty  through  education.  secure the current income gain from access to the
The poverty trap argument depends on children's  program,  with modest impact on earnings from their
work being substitutable for schooling. Casual  children's work.
observations and the descriptive statistics available from  The authors'  tests were limited. Work may well
surveys seem to offer littLe  support for the argument.  displace time for doing homework or attending after-
To explore  the  questioni more  deeply.  Ravallion  and  school  tutorials,  for  example.  Ravallion  and  Quentin
Wodon  use a targeted  school  stipend  to identify  how  were  unable  to identify  such  effects from  the data
nmuch clhild labor  substitutes  for  schooling.  They  find  that  available.
Bangladesh's  Food-for-Education  program  is a strong  There  may also be  other  welfare  losses to children
incentive  tor  school  attendance.  A stipend  with  a value  from  work  (such as exposure  to  an unsafe  working
considerably  less than  the  mean  child wage  was enough  environment)  as well  as welfare  gains (such  as skills
to ensure  nearly  full school  attendance  among  learned  from  working  that  enhance  returns  to schooling).
participants.  But their  results  do lead  them  to question  the
The  enrollment  subsidy  also  reduced  the incidence  of  seemingly  common  view that  child  labor  is a major  factor
clhild labor,  an effect  that  accounted  for  only a small  perpetuating  poverty  in Bangladesh  by keeping  children
proportion  of the  increase  in school  enrollment.  The  from  poor  families  out  of school.
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Schooling  typically  raises future earnings.  Yet one finds relatively  low enrollments  amongst
currently  poor families. A common  explanation  is that schooling  competes  with labor-intensive
jobs for children  (wage labor, employment  in family  enterprises,  or collection  activities).  By this
view,  the low current incomes  of their families  keeps poor children  out of school and thus
perpetuates  their poverty  into the next  generation. 2
If this is right, then policy  reforms  that promote labor-intensive  production  - the
comparative  advantage  of most low-income  countries  - are a mixed  blessing  for the poor; trade
liberalization  may well attract  poor children  out of school prematurely.  Pro-growth  trade policies
may then come at a cost to human  development,  and possibly future  growth,  in poor countries.
A recent study of child labor in a city in western  India concluded  that: "The prevalence  and
absolute  expansion  of child labor in a period and region of relatively  high growth  of aggregate
output indicates  that the nature  of economic  growth is flawed" (Swaminathan,  1998: 1526).
One proposal  has been to ban child  labor in developing  countries,  as it had been by the
late nineteenth  century in most present-day  developed  countries. It is recognized  that a ban could
come  at a cost to the short-term  welfare  of the poor, 3 though a proper  assessment  would have  to
take account  of general equilibrium  effects,  particularly  on the labor  market. 4 However,  the
2  This  assumes  that parents  cannot  borrow  to finance  schooling  or enter  binding  contracts  with
their  children.  On  the implications  of  contract  enforcement  problems  for understanding  why  child  labor
exists  see  Baland  and  Robinson  (1998).
3  Heywood  (1988)  describes  the  resistance  to bans  on  child  labor  in late  nineteenth  century  France.
4  Famously,  Simonde  de Sismonde  argued  that  child  labor  lowered  parents'  wages  and  so  "their
activity  has  not  produced  an improvement  in  the incomes  of the poor"  (Heywood,  1988,  p.222). Also  see
Basu  and  Van  (1998)  who  argue  that  there  can  be multiple  equilibria  in  the labor  market  such  that  one
equilibrium  entails  child  labor  with  low  wages  while  the other  has higher  wages  but  no child  labor.
2enforceability of a ban on child labor is a moot point. While child labor bans were eventually
introduced in most of Europe during the nineteenth century, enforcement was very difficult, and
it has been argued that other factors (rising incomes, and technological change) were more
important in reducing child labor (Nardinelli, 1980; Heywood, 1988). In most developing
countries, it is far from obvious how a ban could be enforced, especially in rural areas.
Observations such as these have led to a search for other ways to reduce child labor while
keeping the advantages to the poor of labor-intensive growth in developing countries.  One
seemingly appealing option is to make schooling more attractive to parents, and this has been
favored by a number of observers. 5 An obvious policy instrument for this purpose is a targeted
enrollment subsidy. Motivated by a desire to reduce both current and future poverty, cash or in-
kind transfers targeted to poor families - but conditional on their kids staying at school - have
recently become popular in developing countries. If there is substitution between child labor and
schooling then such programs will reduce child labor. Of course, the foregone income of
participants could then be high (though presumably less than the value of the subsidy) - raising
concerns about the efficiency of such programs as a means of reducing current poverty.
Both the arguments that "child labor reflects bad growth", and that "making schools
cheaper can turn it into good growth" assume that child labor displaces schooling.  This paper
tests that assumption. To do so we study the effects on schooling and child labor of an
enrollment subsidy in Bangladesh.  We measure the extent of substitution by seeing how much
the extra schooling induced by the subsidy comes out of child labor. We do not evaluate the
programn,  but only use it as means of identifying how much child labor displaces schooling.
s  Including  Grootaert  and Kanbur  (1995), World  Bank (1995,  Chapter 11; 1999),
Psacharopoulos  (1997), and Grootaert  and Patrinos  (1998).
3The next section compares our approach to alternatives suggested by the literature.
Section 3 outlines our theoretical model, demonstrating that an enrollment subsidy increases
schooling, but need not reduce child labor. We then turn to our data and econometric model in
section 4.  Our main empirical results can be found in section 5, and section 6 concludes.
2.  Testing for Substitution between Child Labor and Schooling
Children are a current economic resource for poor parents.  It is common to find children
doing productive work of some sort in poor rural economies.  Cain (1977) found that children in
a Bangladeshi village were economically active from the age of six, and that boys were net
producers by 15. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) found that child labor helps smooth the incomes of
rural Indian families, consistent with poorly developed credit and risk markets.
However, there are ways that poor families can protect the schooling of working children,
because there are other things that children do besides school and work. To allow double shifts
(given limited school building and other facilities), primary school days of four hours or so per
child are common. Longer school days than this also create logistic problems of feeding the
children. Public primary ("vernacular medium") schools in Bangladesh are open about 120 days
a year and the school day entails 3-4 hours of class time (about 17 hours per week, with slightly
less at junior grades, and slightly more at private schools). A survey for Bangladesh found that
boys (5-14) in rural areas classified as being in the workforce (including work on the family farm
or non-farm enterprise) did an average of 26 hours work per week; the corresponding average for
girls was 20 hours (BBS, 1996, Table 6.10).  So one cannot assume that the time these children
spend working must come at the expense of formal time at school, although there may be
displacement of informal (after-school) tutorials or homework.
4How might one measure the effect of child labor on schooling?  A common method is to
compare the educational attainments of children who work with those who do not. From such
comparisons, Psacharopoulos (1997) concludes that child labor leads to two years less schooling
on average (using data for Bolivia and Venezuela). This suggests that child labor entails a large
cost to childrens' future welfare. However, the possibility of selection bias through the choices
made by parents clouds such comparisons. The parents of children who currently work may well
send their kids to school less than do other parents even when work is not an option.
Tf  one could do an experiment that created an exogenous increase in schooling, then one
could simply see how much child labor fell as a consequence.  An exogenous decrease in the
price of schooling would qualify for such an experiment. An important element in the price of
schooling is the wage rate for child labor. However, this is also the price of leisure (assuming
that parents are free to allocate their children's time; we return to that assumption later).  Thus
disentangling the own price effect from the cross-price effect is problematic using wage data. 6
One might look for other indicators of school price.  The presence of a school in the
village of residence is one possibility (Rozenzweig, 1982). Another is the distance or travel time
to the nearest school (Grootaert, 1998) or average out-of-pocket expenditures on schooling in the
area of residence (Cartwright, 1998). On a priori grounds it is unclear just how well such
variables measure the price of schooling, and the usual concerns arise about attenuation bias due
to the use of weak proxies.  The endogeneity of both access and average school expenditures also
raises concerns, since these measures may well pick up spurious geographic effects.  The existing
evidence for effects of school price on child labor is mixed, although it is recognized in the
6  To add to the difficulty,  wages for child labor  are rarely collected (or at least in the same surveys
for which other relevant  data are required),  or are badly  measured.
5literature that this may be due to poor indicators of school price (Grootaert and Patrinos, 1998).
We follow a different route. We examine how parents' choices between sending their
kids to school versus work in rural Bangladesh are affected by the Food-for-Education (FFE)
program. The program aims to keep the children of poor rural families in school.  In 1995-96, 2.2
million children participated (13% of total enrolment). Participating households receive monthly
food rations as long as they send their children to primary school. Targeting is done in two
stages.  First economically backward areas are chosen by the center. Second, community groups
-exploiting  idiosyncratic local information - select participants within those areas.
From the 1995-96 Household Expenditure Survey (HES) done by the Bangladesh Bureau
of Statistics (BBS), the mean amount of rice received under the FFE program was 114 kg per
year per participating household. Based on the same survey, we estimate that the average price of
rice paid by the poor in 1996 was 12.5 Tk per kilo in rural areas.  That translates in an average
monetary value for the FFE stipend of 119 Tk per month.  A separate BBS survey in 1996 found
that the average monthly income of boys in paid work was 464 Tk while it was 291 Tk for girls
(BBS, 1996, Table 5.11, p.53).  Given that there are on average about two children of primary-
school age in participating households, the value of the FFE stipend is about 13% of the average
monthly earnings of boys and 20% of that for girls.'
To receive the stipend, children must attend at least 85 percent of all classes each month.
The headmaster of the school monitors school attendance and the food distribution is made
within the school each week. The schools submit estimates of their grain needs to the local
district headquarters, which then takes charge of transport, distribution, and handling.
7  These are probably  underestimates,  since there is anecdotal  evidence  that FFE rations  are sold to
buy cheaper grain, suggesting  that FFE  rice has a higher price  that we have assumed.
6The FFE stipend is a pure discount on the price of schooling to parents.  Our data include
both participants and non-participants, and we allow for the purposive targeting of the stipend.
We can thus use the existence of this program as a quasi-experiment to test whether child labor
substitutes for schooling.  The test also throws direct light on the effectiveness of an enrolment
incentive in reducing child labor, as is often recommended in policy discussions.
3.  The Effect of a School Stipend on Child Labor
In this section we provide a rudimentary model of parents' decisions about how to
allocate their children's time. The model is no more complex than is needed to demonstrate
formally the argument in the previous section that there can be no presumption that cheaper
schooling will reduce child labor. We assume that parents care about current consumption and
their children's  schooling, which may give pleasure in its own right, but will presumably also
make parents directly better off in the future, via transfers from their adult children. Parents also
attach value to their children's leisure and/or domestic labor within the home.
The effects of a program such as FFE will depend in part on what constraints parents face
in allocating their children's time. Schooling is not compulsory in most low-income countries,
and so there is no constraint requiring a minimum amount of schooling.  There is a maximum in
public and NGO schools. When this is binding, the FFE stipend becomes an ordinary targeted
transfer payment.  The program may still likely to reduce child labor, but only via the income
effect, assuming that children's leisure is a normal good for parents). However, since the
program exists as a response to low school attendance amongst the poor, we will not assume that
the constraint on maximum school attendance is binding.
If there is underemployment of child labor then this will also constrain parents' choices.
7If the wage rate for child labor is inflexible downwards then a small increase in the stipend will
have no effect on child labor - the extra time at school will come out of leisure.
However, it is hard to see what would generate downward inflexibility in child wages in
this setting.  There are no child labor unions to our knowledge. Adverse effects of low adult
wages on nutritional status and (hence) productivity can yield downward wage inflexibility
(under the well-known Efficiency Wage Hypothesis).  However, while income pooling may not
be complete within the household, it is plain that children do share in the family's total resources,
in which case the link from children's own wages to their nutritional status will be weak. 8
Thus it would seem reasonable to assume that parents in this setting are free to determine
how their children's time is allocated.  In making that choice, let parents' utility be:
U=  U(C,S,H;Z  (1)
where the household's  current consumption is C, S is the child's school attendance, and H is the
child's leisure.  We assume that U is strictly quasi-concave in C, S and H.  We allow for
heterogeneity by including a vector of exogenous household and local geographic variables Z.
The child's total time available (I) can be devoted to schooling, leisure (H), or wage labor (L):
S+H+L  =T  (2)
In addition to income from child labor or the FFE stipend, the household obtains an income Y
from other sources, which we assume to also be a function of Z.  (The latter will include the
parents' education and landholding.)  So the budget constraint is:
C = wL + bS + Y(Z)  (3)
where w is the wage rate for child labor, and b is the monetary value of the food received under
8  A survey by the Bangladesh  Bureau  of Statistics  in 1996  found  that 83% of children in rural areas
paid  their earnings  to their parents  (BBS,  1996,  Table 5.12, p. 54).
8the FFE program. The stipend is zero if the household is not selected for FFE participation.
Parents maximize (1) subject to (2) and (3) with respect to C, S, H and L, given w, b, Z
and T. This is equivalent to maximizing (1) with respect to C, H, and S, subject to:
C  + (w-b)S + wH= wT+Y(Z)  (4)
This makes clear that w-b is the price of schooling.  With no other constraints on time allocation,
the parents' choice equates the MRS between consumption and schooling with school price w-b,
and it equates the MRS between consumption and leisure with the price of leisure, w. The
derived demand function of parents for their children's  schooling and leisure are then:
S  = S(w-b, w, wT+Y(Z),  Z)  (5)
H=  H(w, w-b, wT+Y(Z), Z)  (6)
The supply of child labor is then determined as a residual using (2). The corresponding utility-
compensated demand functions minimize the full expenditure, C +(w-b)S+wH, needed to attain a
given level of utility, and so are given by:
S  =S*(w-b, w, U,  Z)  (7)
H=  H*(w, w-b, U, Z)  (8)
The effect of an increase in the stipend reveals how time allocation varies with the price
of schooling. Using the Slutsky decomposition, the effect on the supply of child labor is:
A9L  dS*  +  H*  _  (H+S)
ab  a(w-  b)  a(w - b)  a(wT + Y(Z))
If this is negative then child labor is a substitute for schooling.  Quasi-concavity of U implies that
the first term on the RHS of (9) - the utility compensated own-price effect on demand for
schooling - is negative. The third term in (9) is negative, assuming that schooling and leisure
are a normnal  good in total (i.e., that H+S is increasing in full income at given w and b).  The
9second term is the utility-compensated cross-effect of the price of schooling on demand for
children's leisure, or (equivalently, by symmetry of the Slutsky matrix) the effect of the price of
leisure on schooling.  The sign of this effect is ambiguous.  It will be positive if schooling and
leisure are (utility-compensated) substitutes. A sufficient condition for the program incentive to
reduce child labor is that schooling and leisure are complements.
So it is unclear on theoretical grounds whether a reduction in the price of schooling
generated by a higher stipend will reduce child labor; the extra time spent at school may well
come out of children's  leisure. And, by the same token, if the substitution effects between
schooling and leisure are strong enough, child labor will not come at much cost to longer-term
prospects of children escaping poverty. Our empirical work tests these effects.
4.  Data and Estimation Methods
We test whether work is a substitute for schooling using a household survey for
Bangladesh, with a matched community survey.  We use data from BBS's  1995-96 national
Household Expenditure Survey (HES). We only use the rural sample in the HES, since the FFE
program is not found in urban areas. The HES included questions on FFE participation.  The
survey did not include time use. We measure the incidence of child labor according to survey
responses to the question: "What was your normal activity last week?".  A child is deemed to be
in the labor force if the answer was "employed",  "employed but not working", "household
work", or "seeking work". By this definition, 11.8% of boys and 12.1% of girls aged 5-16 in the
sample were classified as being in the workforce.  It is likely that this understates the extent of
child labor, either because of deliberate under-reporting, or because relatively small amounts of
part time work are not deemed to constitute the child's  "normal activity".
10Our theoretical model assumed an interior solution.  This is reasonable since it is likely
that most, if not all, children in rural Bangladesh work at least a few hours each month. However,
our data only allow us to test for effects on whether a child's "normal activity" is being in the
workforce. This will presumably entail that the child works more than some number of hours,
though we do not (of course) know what that number is. (It is very unlikely that parents will
report working as their children's "normal activity" if the number of hours worked is "low", but
how low we cannot say.)  Clearly, these data do not allow us to capture any effects of the
program on small amounts of child labor, though presumably it should not be hard to
accommodate modest amounts of part-time work while still keeping children at school.
We assume that a child is reported to be in the workforce if the amount of work done
exceeds some latent critical value, rl. Actual labor supply differs from il by an amount 7iX+ 8,
for a vector of observed variables X, with corresponding parameters at,  and an additive random
error term, E, that is taken to be a normally distributed innovation error. The probability of the
child being reported as normally in the labor force is then the value of F(nX) where F is the
distribution function of E. Thus we estimate a probit on the observed binary variable (taking the
value one if the child's normal activity is to be in the workforce, and zero otherwise). We use the
data for all children in rural areas aged 5-16, and we estimate separate probits for boys and girls.
In modeling school attendance we follow reasonably standard practices in the literature.
A question in the HES asked: "What is your current educational status". 9 We estimate a probit
for the answers to this question, for all children aged 5-16 years who have not completed primary
school. (We use a wide age interval because the average time to complete primary school in rural
9  Alternatively  we could have  used  the "normal activity"  question,  for which "student" is one
possible  response.  However,  we decided  that the educational  status question  would be more reliable.
11Bangladesh is nine years; World Bank, 1996.)
We find that 74% of boys in the sample were recorded as "currently attending school",
and 75% of girls.  Of the 1295 children not at school (685 boys), 704 (378 boys) were not
classified as being at work in the "normal activity" question either. So the data do not suggest
that the majority of those children not at school are normally working instead.
The extent of household participation in the FFE program is measured by the actual
quantity of foodgrains received under the program. Apart from program participation, the
explanatory variables in the regressions include household size and family structure variables,
the education levels of the father and the mother, the land ownership, the age of the kid and the
religion, and a number of village level variables on school access and quality.
Household participation in the program is treated as endogenous. There are two levels of
purposive targeting: selection of the village, and selection of the household. The community
module provides independent information on whether the village participates in FFE. Given that
geographic placement is based on explicit targeting criteria, it is reasonable to treat this aspect of
the purposive targeting as a problem of selection-on-observables.  However, that is not plausible
for individual placement, given that the program is designed to exploit idiosyncratic local
information.  Our estimation method assumes that household-level participation depends on
unobservables (notably the idiosyncratic information on household-level circumstances held by
those allocating the program within villages) but village level placement can be accounted for
adequately by a set of observed control variables at village level. This is consistent with what we
know about how the program was targeted in practice (section 2).
In addition to the common vector of explanatory variables X (which includes the FFE
stipend), the probits for schooling and child labor included the residuals from a first stage tobit
12regression for explaining the FFE stipend. This first stage regression included X and a dummy
variable for village participation.  To be a valid instrumental variable, village participation must
not affect child labor or schooling controlling for the variables in the second-stage regressions.
Under this identifying assumption and with normally distributed errors, we can consistently
estimate the coefficient on the FFE stipend in the probits for child labor and schooling as long as
we control for the residuals from the first-stage regression. '° The coefficient on the residuals also
provides an exogeneity test.
Given the way the program is targeted, village-level participation is a suitable instrument
for participation at the individual level provided one includes a set of geographic control
variables for village placement (Ravallion and Wodon, 1998).  The set of geographic controls
include distances to school; the type of school (govermmental,  private, NGO); a series of school
quality variables reported in the community survey; land distribution; irrigation intensity; road
quality; electrification; distance and time to thana and district headquarters and to Dhaka;
distance to various facilities (health care, Banks, governnent  agencies); incidence of natural
disasters; attitudes to women's  employment, education and family planning; average schooling
levels of the head and spouse; majority religion of the village; and population size of the village.
These were (jointly) very good predictors of program placement. A probit regression of whether
the village had the program on the geographic control variables gave a pseudo-R 2 of 0.55 (Chi-
square of 91.7 which is significant at the 0.5% level, with 166 observations).
10  Datt and Ravallion  (1994, Appendix  1) prove consistency  for a more general  simultaneous  tobit
model (generalizing  Smith and Blundell, 1986,  to allow for a censored  endogenous  variable).  The
consistency  proof  for our case is a minor  variation.  If the FFE stipend  was continuous  (rather than
censored)  then our estimation  method  would be the same  as that proposed  by Rivers and Vuong (1988).
135.  Results
Table 1 gives  the probits  for child labor  and schooling.  The FFE stipend  has a significant
negative effect on children's  labor force participation,  and it has a strong opposite  effect  on the
probability of being  at school. Exogeneity  of the stipend  is rejected (at the 5% level)  for boys'
work and (at almost  the 10%  level) for girls' schooling. At the mean of the sample,  an extra 100
kilos of rice increases  the probability  of a boy going  to school  by 0.17, and 0.16 for a girl. The
FFE stipend appears  to be about  right for achieving  full school  attendance  for kids at the current
average  attendance  rate  (about 0.74) and receiving  the average  stipend (114 kilos).
The displacement  of child labor is smaller  than the gain in schooling.  An extra 100  kg. of
rice reduces  the incidence  of child labor by 0.04 and 0.02 for boys and girls respectively  (31%
and 18% of mean child-labor  incidence). So, for boys selected  for the program,  lower  incidence
of child labor accounts  for about one quarter  of the increase  in school enrolment;  for girls, it
accounts for one eighth.
Recall that the average  wage for boys is 464 Tk/month,  and 291 Tk for girls.  Then the
stipend's effect on child  labor (Table 1) implies  an average  foregone  income from FFE
participation  of 16.7  Tk/month  for boys and 6.4 Tk for girls. A typical FFE family  has two
children  of primary-school  age. For a family  with one school-age  boy and one school-age  girl,
the foregone income  from FFE participation  is then 19%  of the estimated  monetary  value of the
FFE stipend  of 1  19 Tk/month  (section  2).
So there is a large net transfer  benefit  to poor households  from the program. There is of
course also a benefit  over time,  through  higher schooling.  Wodon  (1999) finds  that completing
primary school in rural  Bangladesh  increases  expected  per capita  consumption  by nine  percent
14(controlling for a range of individual and household characteristics). And there are likely to be
other benefits from the higher school attendance induced by the program, including through
better health-care and greater ability to participate in society. A complete evaluation would have
to also consider the costs, of course. For example, unless there is excess capacity (which seems
unlikely) or a sufficient contemporaneous investment on the supply-side, the higher enrollments
due to the program will create congestion in schools, lowering the quality of education.
The effects of household demographic variables are generally weak.  Children from larger
households are neither more nor less likely to be in the workforce, or at school.  A higher share
of working-age adult males in the family reduces child labor by boys.  This suggests greater
pressure for boys to earn income when in families where there are fewer adult male eamers.
There is a negative effect of female headship on girls'  schooling.
There are very strong effects of parental education on children's  child labor and
schooling.  Higher parental education is associated with lower incidence of child labor and
higher school attendance rates.  There are qualitatively similar effects of maternal education,
although they are not as large in magnitude or as significant statistically.
Finally, owning more land decreases girls' child labor, but not boys. Parents with larger
holdings may well have larger demand for boy's labor time in helping to supervise hired labor-
an activity that is unlikely to be seen as appropriate for girls in rural Bangladesh.
6.  Conclusions
We have tried to determine if children sent to work in rural Bangladesh are caught in a
poverty trap, such that the extra current income to poor families from child labor comes at the
expense of the children's longer term prospects of escaping poverty through education.
15Concerns about the effects of child labor on schooling have often been raised in development-
policy debates, including in recent discussions of the welfare effects of labor-intensive growth
fuelled by trade liberalization.
The poverty trap argument depends critically on the substitution possibilities between
children's leisure and schooling. On a priori grounds it would not seem difficult for parents to
assure that a child in Bangladesh working for (say) 20 hours per week can still attend all primary
school classes.  Nor does it seem that the majority of children who have not finished primary
school, but are not at school, are normally working. Casual observations and the descriptive
statistics available from surveys do not seem to offer much support for the poverty trap idea.
To explore the question more deeply, we have used a targeted school stipend to identify
how much child labor substitutes for schooling.  We find strong effects on school attendance of
the incentive provided by Bangladesh's Food-for-Education program. A stipend with a value
considerably less than the mean child wage was enough to assure nearly full school attendance
amongst participants.  This impact on schooling is likely to be socially beneficial from a number
of points of view.
Our results suggest that the enrollment subsidy also reduced the incidence of child labor.
However, this effect only accounts for a small proportion of the increase in school enrolment; the
reduction in the incidence of child labor by boys (girls) represents about one quarter (eighth) of
the increase in their school enrollment rate. Parents are clearly substituting other uses of their
children's time, so as to secure the current income gain from access to the program with modest
impact on earnings from their children's work.
Our tests are limited in a number of respects. Work may well displace time for doing
homework or attending after-school tutorials; we have not been able to identify such effects with
16the data available. There may  also be other  welfare losses  to children  from work (such as when
this entails exposure  to an unsafe  working  environment).  And  there may well be other gains
(such as when the skills leant from working  enhance  the returns  from schooling). However,  our
results  do lead us to question  the seemingly  common  view that child labor is a major factor
perpetuating  poverty in this setting  by keeping children  from  poor families out of school.
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19Table 1: Impact of the Food-for-Education Program on child labor and schooling
Work  by boys  Work by  girls  Schooling  of boys  Schooling  of girls
dF/dX  Std. Err.  P>Izl  dF/dX  Std.  Err.  P>jzl  dF/dX  Std. Err.  P>Izl  dF/dX  Std. Err.  P>Izl
FFE stipend  -0.036  0.011  0.000  -0.022  0.007  0.000  0.172  0.034  0.000  0.160  0.033  0.000
FFE residuals to correct for endogeneity  -0.004  0.002  0.016  0.000  0.001  0.676  -0.005  0.006  0.355  -0.009  0.006  0.108
Household characteristics
Log household size  -0.007  0.009  0.404  -0.003  0.006  0.618  0.008  0.032  0.790  -0.022  0.030  0.461
Share boys 5 to 9  -0.003  0.033  0.934  -0.004  0.023  0.876  0.021  0.120  0.863  -0.105  0.114  0.359
Share girls 5 to 9  -0.052  0.035  0.125  0.004  0.021  0.831  0.189  0.123  0.125  -0.179  0.114  0.116
Share boys 10 to 16  -0.012  0.029  0.684  -0.041  0.021  0.030  -0.063  0.104  0.548  0.005  0.100  0.959
Share girls 10 to 16  -0.052  0.033  0.102  -0.044  0.023  0.034  0.002  0.109  0.989  -0.100  0.105  0.340
Share adults male  17 to 40  -0.113  0.040  0.002  -0.056  0.025  0.010  0.243  0.129  0.060  -0.047  0.119  0.692
Share adults female 17 to 40  -0.044  0.041  0.288  -0.049  0.029  0.060  0.132  0.146  0.367  0.218  0.142  0.126
Share adults male above 40  -0.022  0.040  0.578  0.003  0.028  0.915  -0.036  0.145  0.805  -0.156  0.143  0.275
Share adults female above 40  -0.057  0.043  0.188  -0.003  0.027  0.919  0.179  0.148  0.227  -0.088  0.146  0.548
Female household head  -0.013  0.014  0.462  0.001  0.014  0.934  0.049  0.063  0.470  -0.193  0.099  0.023
No spouse, married  0.009  0.025  0.684  0.012  0.019  0.442  -0.070  0.077  0.330  0.040  0.058  0.518
No spouse, single  0.056  0.052  0.096  0.009  0.016  0.464  -0.023  0.068  0.724  0.026  0.053  0.638
No spouse, div./widowed  0.024  0.031  0.331  0.010  0.022  0.574  -0,251  0.096  0.003  -0.038  0.077  0.599
Age of the child  0.029  0.013  0.058  0.014  0.007  0.079  0.248  0.030  0.000  0.293  0.030  0.000
Age of the child squared  0.000  0.001  0.701  0.000  0.000  0.779  -0.014  0.002  0.000  -0.016  0.002  0.000
Non-Muslim  0.008  0.012  0.413  -0.004  0.005  0.435  -0,053  0.039  0.148  -0.057  0.036  0.089
Education of father and mother
Father below class 5  -0.015  0.006  0.013  -0.011  0.004  0.003  0.095  0.022  0.000  0.089  0.020  0.000
Father class 5 (primary completed)  -0.023  0.006  0.001  -0.015  0.004  0.000  0.104  0.025  0.001  0.119  0.020  0.000
Father class 6 to 9 (secondary school)  -0.021  0.006  0.001  -0.019  0.005  0.000  0.111  0.024  0.000  0.140  0.018  0.000
Father higher level  -0.028  0.007  0.000  -0.019  0.005  0.000  0.197  0.018  0.000  0.192  0.012  0.000
Mother below class 5  -0.013  0.007  0.094  -0.008  0.005  0.179  0.112  0.024  0.000  0.092  0.025  0.004
Mother class 5 (primary completed)  -0.022  0.007  0.010  -0.015  0.004  0.001  0.099  0.030  0.006  0.088  0.029  0.016
Mother class 6 to 9 and higher  0.020  0.016  0.170  0.005  0.010  0.632  0.033  0.047  0.489  0.094  0.048  0.052
Land ownership
0.05 to 0.49 acres  0.006  0.009  0.439  -0.005  0.004  0.297  0.016  0.027  0.544  0.051  0.023  0.033
0.50 to 1.49 acres  -0.011  0.008  0.194  -0.011  0.004  0.015  0.100  0.026  0.001  0.119  0.021  0.000
1.50 to 2.49 acres  -0.003  0.010  0.799  -0.010  0.004  0.070  0.137  0.024  0.000  0.122  0.022  0.000
2.50 acres or more  -0.003  0.010  0.800  -0.008  0.005  0.114  0.124  0.027  - 0.000  0.125  0.023  0.000Source:  Regressions  by the authors  using 1995-96  Household  Expenditure  Survey  for Bangladesh.  The values  of dF/dX  are estimated  at the sample  means.
Sample  sizes:  2441 boys  and 2323 girls. Pseudo  R2 of 0.38 for work for boys,  0.44 for work for girls, 0.20 for schooling  for boys,  and 0.26 for schooling  for
girls.  The excluded  categories  for dummy  variables  are male household  head,  spouse  present,  illiterate  father,  illiterate  mother,  landless  household,  and Muslim
household.  The regressions  also included  about  60 variables  describing  schools  and communities  likely  to influence  program  placement  at village level. The
column  P>Itl  denotes  the significance  level. The residuals  used  to correct  for endogeneity  were obtained  from a first-stage  tobit for the FFE stipend  which
included  village-level  selection  for the program  as an instrumental  variable;  the latter  was highly significant  in the first-stage  regression  as were many other
variables,  and generally  with  expected  signs.  The first stage  regression  was estimated  on a sample  of 3625 household.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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